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1. Introduction 
The study of markets plays a central role in economics; naturally enough in view of the fact that the 
market mechanism is of crucial importance for modern economies and has been so throughout 
history. There are to be sure examples of economic systems – most notably the communist 
economies of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence - where governments have tried to 
suppress the operation of the market mechanism and replace it with central planning. However, it is 
a remarkable feature of these attempts that they have not proved to be viable; detailed central 
planning has turned out to encounter so many difficulties that the market system has reestablished 
itself in the reformed economies of Russia and Eastern Europe. Another notable aspect of central 
planning is that the theory of the market economy has been an important point of reference for the 
proper understanding of how a system of economic planning works. This reference has sometimes 
taken the form of setting the efficient market up as a contrast to an inefficient system of central 
planning, but it has also played a more subtle role in the debate about alternative economic systems. 
Thus, in the interwar period, the Polish economist Oskar Lange coined the phrase “market socialism” 
to describe his interesting blueprint for an efficiently functioning socialist economy. In Lange’s 
system, the central planning committee of the socialist state would design its system so that it would 
work like a smoothly functioning market economy but without the market failures that are important 
features of real market economies and which also lie in the central field of interest of the theoretical 
economist (see Lange and Taylor 1938). 
There are obviously a large number of markets in the modern economy, and many of these have 
special features that distinguish them from the markets for other goods. Markets for services have 
characteristics that make them different from the markets for physical commodities, and within the 
service sector there are a number of differences between e.g. the market for financial services and 
that for health care. In the markets for ordinary consumer goods, agricultural markets in many 
countries operate in an institutional framework that is different from the markets for industrial 
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products, and in order to fully understand the markets for durable goods like housing and paintings 
one has to acquire specialized knowledge that goes beyond a general insight in economic theory. 
In spite of these complexities, economists have since the beginning of their science assumed that 
there are some general features of all markets that can form a useful framework for the study both 
of individual markets and of their interaction with other markets, and it is this general framework 
that I will focus on in the following discussion. This must not be taken to mean that there is a fixed 
body of theory that all academic economists adhere to in every respect. In an evolving science there 
must necessarily be a number of researchers that are dissatisfied with the present state of the 
subject and are engaged in its further improvement. In addition, there is naturally less than complete 
agreement about the new directions that economics in general and the economic theory of markets 
in particular should take. If this were not the case, economics would be a stationary subject with little 
appeal to the intellectually curious. But within the confines of a single paper I cannot possibly cover 
all new developments in the study of the market economy and have to limit my focus to what the 
majority of the profession would probably agree on as being the central features of the study of 
markets. 
What we usually refer to as the market economy cannot be understood by focusing on markets 
alone. In any market economy there is a substantial public sector that allocates resources by the use 
of planning and bureaucracy without the use of markets, and some parts of resource allocation take 
place within firms, families and voluntary organizations. Throughout the history of economics there 
has been a lively debate on the appropriate roles of the private and public sectors in the economy, 
especially on the role of markets versus planning. This requires a normative analysis of what markets 
can and cannot do and to what extent the achievements of markets are in accordance with some 
notion of social welfare or the common good. Thus, the theory of markets has both positive 
(descriptive) and normative aspects, and both aspects will be discussed in the following. I begin with 
positive economics. 
4 
 
    
2. Supply and demand 
In the centre of the theory of markets is the concept of a commodity (which could be a physical 
good, a service or even a financial asset or liability). Grouped around the commodity are the market 
agents, i.e. the consumers and producers or buyers and sellers. Consumers are buyers in the markets 
for consumer goods and sellers in the markets for factors of production, in particular in the labour 
market. For producers it is the other way round; they are sellers in the markets for consumer goods 
and buyers in the markets for factors of production1. Whatever the market, we can identify a set of 
buyers and sellers. For the buyers, it is natural to assume that they will wish to buy more of the 
commodity in question the lower is the price, assuming that all other prices remain the same. For 
sellers, an equally natural assumption is that they will wish to sell more, the higher is the price. The 
price that is such that the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied is the equilibrium price. If 
the actual price is higher than this, there is excess supply, and the price will tend to fall. If the price is 
lower than the equilibrium price, there is a situation of excess demand, and the price will rise. The 
equilibrium price is in other words that towards which the actual market price will tend to converge, 
although at a particular moment of time it might deviate from it.  
This account depicts the theory of supply, demand and price determination with reference to a single 
market and is therefore often referred to as partial equilibrium theory. But markets are interrelated: 
The demand for cars depends not only on the price of cars but also on the prices of petrol and 
railway tickets, just like the demand for petrol depends on the prices of cars and railway tickets. In 
fact, since on the demand side all consumer goods compete for the consumers’ money, the demand 
for every consumer good depends in principle on the prices of all consumer goods. Likewise, on the 
supply side an increase in the price of a particular good tends to lead producers to produce more of 
it, while an increase in the price of a factor of production creates incentives for producers to use less 
                                                          
1 In addition, there are the markets for intermediate goods where firms produce factors of production, like 
machinery and raw materials, for use in production by other firms.  
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of it and instead use more of other factors of production that have become relatively cheaper. 
Production decisions with regard to inputs and outputs therefore depend on the prices of all inputs 
and outputs in the economy. If we try to construct a model of the whole economy, or at least of the 
whole market system in the economy, we have to introduce the notion of the equilibrium set of 
prices instead of just the equilibrium price, and this set of prices is such that it leads to equality of 
supply and demand in all markets. This is the definition of general equilibrium.  
The general equilibrium theory of the market economy, as it was first formulated by Léon Walras 
(1874-77), is a very ambitious theory. In principle, it claims to determine the quantities produced and 
consumed of all goods and factors of production in the economy as well as the distribution of income 
as the result of the interplay of the forces of supply and demand. The general model has a number of 
special versions that can be adapted to the study of particular aspects of economic life. The purpose 
of these models is typically to study the effects on prices, industrial structure and income distribution 
of changes in such exogenous data as world market prices, various types of technical progress and 
the discovery of new supplies of natural resources. They offer a framework for the study of why 
some industries decline and others expand, why the wages of some professions fall and others rise, 
and why the holdings of some forms of capital become more profitable while others become less 
attractive to investors. 
Two remarks are in order at this point. First of all, as regards the issue of what the model determines, 
I must emphasize strongly the qualification implicit in the term “in principle”. Naturally, the 
economist cannot possibly claim that he is able to explain or predict all prices and quantities in the 
market economy; such a claim would border on the ridiculous. What the analysis provides is a 
general framework for analysis, a certain way of thinking, that can be applied to more concrete cases 
both by theoretical adaptation of the general model and numerical calculation. One set of cases 
relates to the problems that arise in an open economy, where models address issues like the effects 
of trade liberalization or increases in migration on the domestic economy. Another class of models is 
6 
 
especially adapted to study the interaction between the private and public sectors and is concerned 
e.g. with the effect of alternative tax systems on the allocation of labour and capital between 
industries. 
A second point worth emphasizing is that the theory of general equilibrium in the market economy 
outlined above is strictly speaking only valid for a special case of a market economy, viz. that of 
perfect competition. Perfect competition is the case where no agent has sufficient power to have 
appreciable influence on the market prices; instead he takes the prices of goods and factors of 
production as determined by impersonal market forces. The real market economy is not quite like 
that. In some branches there are just a few producers, sometimes no more than one, and these often 
do have the power to influence market prices and sometimes even the power to influence the choice 
of economic policies adopted by the government. 
Whatever the market form, it remains a general conclusion of the analysis that prices are determined 
by the interplay of supply and demand forces. To better understand what these forces are, we need 
to go behind the notions of supply and demand and look at what the theory says about the goals and 
incentives of consumers and producers. 
3. Utility maximization and consumer behavior 
In the early days of economic theory the demand side of the economy was not given very much 
attention, and theorists of the market economy were not much concerned with explaining the 
decisions made by consumers2. Thus, Adam Smith in his great work The Wealth of Nations (Smith 
1776) refers rather loosely to the individual as pursuing his own interest, but he does not go deeper 
into the question of what the individual’s interest is or exactly how he goes about pursuing it. The 
establishment of such a deeper theory was a task left for economists of the 19th and 20th centuries 
and is based on the notion of utility maximization. 
                                                          
2 For simplicity I refer to individual agents as consumers, although, as indicated above, the explanation of 
individual behaviour covers both the demand for consumer goods and the supply of factors of production like 
labour.  
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Utility is not an easy concept, and its conceptual content has changed greatly over time. To begin 
with it was seen as a property that goods possessed, and this was why goods were desired. This 
perception of the concept gradually changed to become a measure of the consumer’s preferences; 
that one good had more utility than another was simply an expression of the fact that the first good 
was more preferred that the second. Naturally, the new view led to the realization that since utility 
must be seen as a subjective and not an objective property of goods, it could not be directly 
compared between persons. But it could still function as a basis for the theory of consumer demand. 
The most interesting property of utility then became that of marginal utility as first suggested by 
Gossen (1854). Marginal utility is the increase in utility that you get by consuming an extra unit of the 
commodity. It is reasonable to assume that marginal utility is decreasing; the more you consume, the 
less valuable is the extra unit. Would you be willing to buy the extra unit? This requires a comparison 
between marginal utility and price. As long as marginal utility is higher than the price, you would like 
to buy more of the good. If marginal utility is lower than the price, you would wish to reduce your 
consumption. Your optimal level of consumption is where price and marginal utility coincide. This is 
very abstract. But note that the theory has an empirical implication that is empirically testable: If, at 
your chosen optimum, the price of a particular commodity goes up the quantity demanded will fall; 
similarly, if the price goes down demand will increase. The assumption of utility maximization, 
together with that of decreasing marginal utility, implies the hypothesis that the demand curve – the 
curve showing the relationship between the quantity demanded and the price – is downward 
sloping.  
The theory as sketched here, which roughly corresponds to its state at the end of the 19th century, is 
in many respects unsatisfactory. During the following decades it was refined in a number of ways. 
First of all, it was realized that one had to take account of the consumer’s budget constraint, 
requiring that the sum of expenditure on all goods cannot exceed his income3. This implies that one 
                                                          
3 In an extension of the theory, one can analyze the consumer’s expenditure over time. Then, although equality 
between expenditure and income must hold over the consumer’s lifetime, in any one period such as a week or 
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cannot simply analyze the demand for one commodity at a time; one has to study the joint 
determination of the demand for all commodities. The second refinement relates to the concept of 
utility. Many economists felt uneasy about this both because it came to associate economics too 
closely with utilitarian philosophy and because it seemed to build on some very simplistic 
psychological assumptions. Beginning with Vilfredo Pareto (1909), economics gradually began to 
discard the traditional concept of utility and substitute the notion of a preference ordering. The only 
assumption that was required for a theory of rational consumer choice was that the individual was 
able to rank all available alternatives in terms of preferences. The principle of choice then became to 
choose that among all available alternatives which is ranked highest in the consumer’s preference 
ordering. Remarkably, even this extremely general approach turned out to have implications for 
demand behavior that were empirically meaningful. But although this meant that economic theory 
could do without the concept of utility, utility maximization survived as a convenient representation 
of the more general but cumbersome principle of choosing among available alternatives according to 
one’s preference ordering.   
Whether one considers the theory of utility maximization in its 19th century version or in its most 
recent and more general formulation, the picture that it presents of the individual consumer in the 
market economy is basically the same. The individual attempts to achieve the best possible result for 
himself, given the constraints imposed by his resources. This perspective is applied not only to the 
allocation of his household budget between consumer goods, but also to saving and portfolio 
decisions and to the explanation of labour supply and occupational choice. In recent decades there 
has also been a strong tendency to apply the economic theory of utility maximization and rational 
choice to areas that were previously considered to lie outside the scope of economic analysis. This 
tendency, which has been characterized as “economic imperialism” (Lazear 2000) is particularly 
associated with Gary Becker, who has applied the theory to such areas as crime and punishment 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
a year, expenditure could be either greater than or less than income, depending on the adjustment of cash 
balances and borrowing and lending transactions. 
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(Becker 1968) and family decisions, including marriage, child-bearing and divorce (Becker 1981). 
While Becker’s work has been very influential, the fruitfulness of these extensions of the economic 
approach to social questions has been a disputed issue in the economics profession. 
4. Profit maximization and producer decisions 
The theory of utility maximization attempts to describe demand behavior in the market. On the 
supply side, the corresponding assumption is that of profit maximization. The firm is assumed to 
maximize the difference between sales revenue and costs. A central concept in this theory is the 
production function, which relates output to the input of factors of production like various types of 
labour and capital. The effect on output of a unit’s increase in the input of a particular factor of 
production is called the factor’s marginal productivity. The standard assumption is that marginal 
productivity is positive and decreasing; with successive increases of a particular factor of production, 
the marginal effect on output goes down. In considering whether or not to add an additional unit of 
input, the firm will compare the value of the additional output that this generates with the cost of 
the additional unit, which is simply its price. If the value of marginal productivity exceeds the price of 
the factor, the additional unit should be bought. If the reverse inequality holds, input should be 
reduced. The firm’s optimum is achieved where the value of the marginal productivity is equal to the 
factor price. An obvious implication of this is that an increase in the price of the factor will lead to a 
reduction in demand. In other words, the demand curve for a factor of production is downward 
sloping. By using a similar reasoning, one can show that the supply curve, showing the relationship 
between the price of the output and the amount produced, is upward sloping. 
The theory can be reformulated in a number of ways relative to the simple textbook version that has 
been sketched here. The time dimension can be taken into account by assuming that the firm 
maximizes the present value of future revenues and costs, and there is a large body of literature 
which is based on the view that the firm maximizes its stock market value. A common feature of all 
these formulations is that they see the firm’s objective as being the maximization of the income from 
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the firm that accrues to the owners, while these are assumed to have no other interest in the firm 
than as a source of private income.  
Compared to the hypothesis of utility maximization, profit maximization is a much more specific 
assumption. One could imagine a much richer formulation of the firm’s objectives to include a 
number of additional elements. Some of these could be of a social nature, such as the provision of 
meaningful jobs, environmental responsibility and product quality, while others could relate to the 
private concerns of the management, including on the one hand their personal morality, the size and 
prestige of the firm and managers’ salaries. So why focus on the narrower hypothesis? One line of 
defense is that of explanatory power: If the simple assumption can explain commodity supply and 
factor demand in a way that is consistent with empirical observation, there is no need for a more 
complex hypothesis about objectives. Another line of defense is based on the “rules of the game” in 
the market economy. If the present owners and managers of the firm fail to exploit its earnings 
potential, there will be investors in the market who realize that they can make a profit through a 
take-over bid: By offering the present owners to buy the firm at its present market valuation and 
install a new management they can make a financial gain by running the firm according to the 
principles of profit maximization. According to this logic, if owners and managers want the firm to 
survive in their own hands, they have in fact no choice about which objective to adopt: The only 
alternative is profit maximization. 
These are fairly convincing arguments in favour of the realism of this hypothesis. However, it would 
perhaps be hasty to conclude that there is no need to think further along these lines. On the one 
hand, there may be sectors of the economy where the competitive pressure is not so high as to 
exclude the possibility of pursuing alternative or additional objectives. Second, from the point of 
view of social organization, some people would take the position that government should encourage 
a modification of the competitive system to allow more scope for firms to take account of wider 
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objectives. In order to understand where such a policy might lead, it is clearly necessary to explore 
what implications it would have for firm behavior. 
5. The market mechanism and the public interest 
The foregoing has been a sketch of the economist’s positive theory of the market economy: How do 
markets work? What are the assumptions underlying the economic theory of market behavior? But 
ever since its beginnings, economics has also approached the study of markets from another angle 
which raises normative and critical questions about its social function. 
The question of whether the market mechanism functions in the public interest – whether it can be 
considered to promote social welfare – is a question that has concerned economists at least since the 
time of Adam Smith. The question is a natural one because, in a free market where there are no 
forced transactions, all parties to a particular trade must be assumed to gain from it; otherwise, they 
would be better off abstaining from the transaction.  If individuals are free to enter into any type of 
transaction with each other, all possibilities for mutually advantageous transactions will be exploited, 
and the result will be the best possible use of society’s resources. This set of ideas must have been at 
the back of the minds of many economists when they considered the meaning of the famous 
pronouncement of Adam Smith: 
“Every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of society as great as he 
can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how 
much he is promoting it. … He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in so many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” (Smith 
1776; 1976, p. 456.)  
The invisible hand became Smith’s most famous single formulation and has become a popular point 
of reference for both market enthusiasts and critics ever since. 
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The context in which the quotation appears has given rise to some controversy about “what Smith 
really meant”: It is to be found in a chapter on home versus foreign investment and not as part of a 
general analysis of the social benefits of markets. But the conventional interpretation of the invisible 
hand metaphor gains support from the presence of a number of similar statements elsewhere in the 
Wealth of Nations.4  The reasonable interpretation is that Smith meant it as a general 
characterization of the workings of a market economy with free competition or, as he expressed it, 
“a system of perfect liberty.” The challenge for later economists has been partly to consider in more 
depth how one could arrive at a more precise definition of the public interest, and partly to explore 
the issue of what kind of market competition that is required for Smith’s statement to be true.  
Smith did not himself propose any definition of the public interest, although the term “annual 
revenue of society” suggests that what he had in mind was something like the modern concept of 
national income or product. Obviously, the maximization of national income implies that the total 
amount of resources available for the population is as large as possible. Nevertheless, this measure 
of the public interest also raises some difficult issues. Many of Smith’s policy recommendations 
involved the dismantling of private and public regulation of competition in favour of free markets. It 
is easy to imagine that a reform in this direction, although leading to an increase in national income, 
would at the same time boost the real income for some citizens and lower it for others. Is it 
reasonable to conclude that the reform is unequivocally in the public interest if the gains to the 
winners exceed the losses to the losers? In particular, is this true even if the winners are rich and the 
losers poor? Some economists found an escape from this dilemma in the principles of utilitarian 
philosophy. Suppose that we identify the total welfare of society with the sum of utility enjoyed by 
its members rather than the sum of their income. Further, let us assume that the marginal utility of 
income is greater for the poor than for the rich. A reform in the direction of market liberalization 
then leads to a gain for society only if total utility increases, but the possible losses to the poor are 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of the quotation and references to later discussions of it 
see Sandmo (2011).  
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now given more weight than the gains to the rich. Thus, even if national income were to increase it 
might be that social welfare could go down, since the utilitarian measure takes account both of the 
size of the national income and its distribution between individuals5. 
The utilitarian approach to social welfare is in many ways an attractive one, but many economists 
have been skeptical about the underlying assumption that utility is objectively measurable and 
comparable between persons. If utility is simply a measure of preferences, it is hard to see that it 
makes sense to speak of sums of utility. Pareto took a strong point of view regarding this issue:  
“The utility for one individual and the utility for another individual are heterogeneous 
quantities. We can neither add them together nor compare them. A sum of utility enjoyed by 
different individuals does not exist; it is an expression which has no meaning.” (Pareto 1909; 
1971, p. 192.) 
If we accept this view, is there then no way on the basis of which we can conclude that a social 
reform will lead to a gain for society? According to Pareto, the only case in which such a conclusion is 
possible is where everyone gains from the reform, or at least that some gain and nobody loses. From 
this idea follows the criterion for social efficiency that is known as Pareto optimality: A Pareto 
optimum or an efficient use of resources is such that it is not possible to reallocate resources so as to 
increase the utility of some without decreasing the utility of others. Note that this criterion does not 
require the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Whether utility for an individual goes 
up or down is simply an expression of his or her preferences. 
Using only the criterion of Pareto optimality there are unlikely to be many reforms or other 
developments in the economy that could be clearly identified as representing progress regarding the 
public interest - or social welfare, to use a more modern terminology. But many economists would be 
prepared to go further and identify social progress with reforms or events that improve life for the 
                                                          
5 There are a number of passages in The Wealth of Nations where Smith expresses his sympathy for the poor in 
society, so one may guess that he would have been sympathetic to the utilitarian approach.  
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great majority of citizens, or that clearly lead to a more egalitarian distribution of resources, even if 
some individuals lose in the process. This may mean overstepping the line between neutral economic 
judgment and moral philosophy6, but many economists have taken this step over the years – with 
greater or less awareness of what they are doing. 
Turning now to the nature of competition, Adam Smith’s notion of free competition was somewhat 
loose. The crucial element of his definition was freedom of entry. A single firm that for some reason 
enjoyed protection from competition was a monopoly and as such had the ability to charge higher 
prices than would be possible under free competition; in fact, he states that the price that the 
monopolist will charge is “the highest that can be squeezed out of the buyers” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 
79). But if an attempt to charge monopoly prices could be challenged by new entrants, the monopoly 
position would become worthless. So the absence of limits to entry in this sense leads to a market 
equilibrium that is similar to that of perfect competition even with only one or a few producers7. 
Later developments in economic theory presented a more diversified picture of competition where 
firms had the possibility to exert market power although they did not have a monopoly. In the limit, 
the absence of market power was identified with the case of perfect competition where all 
consumers and producers make their buying and selling decisions on the assumption that market 
prices are beyond their control. When market prices are such that demand is equal to supply in all 
markets, we have a situation of competitive equilibrium.    
One of the main insights of economic theory is now that a competitive equilibrium is a Pareto 
optimum. This means that in such a state of the economy it is not possible to reallocate resources 
between individuals so as to make some of them better off while making no one worse off. In other 
words, the competitive equilibrium is socially efficient; there is no waste of resources. 
                                                          
6 It is possible to argue, however, that the criterion of Pareto optimality is not ethically neutral either, since the 
view that individuals are the best judges of their own interests is itself based on a certain conception of social 
welfare. 
7 For further discussion of Smith’s thoughts on the nature of competition see Sandmo (forthcoming). 
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Note that this result says nothing about the justice or fairness of the distribution of resources or 
income between individuals. The competitive market economy makes it possible for all individuals to 
do as well for themselves as their resources and the market prices allow. But the distribution of 
income and wealth may be equally or unequally distributed. The equivalence between Pareto 
optimality and competitive equilibrium has nothing to say about justice in the distribution of 
resources between individuals. 
A further point worth emphasizing is the following: Since the market equilibrium is socially efficient, 
it might be tempting to conclude that the market agents themselves must have adequate incentives 
to sustain competition. But it is easy to see that this is not the case. The producers in a particular line 
of industry might find in their interest to combine to form a monopoly so as to reap the extra profits 
that such a position allows. This possibility was clearly realized by Adam Smith, who wrote: 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices. 
It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, 
or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of 
the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such 
assemblies; much less to render them necessary.” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 145.) 
So even if competition is beneficial to society (abstracting from the complications of distributive 
justice) the market agents do not themselves have the proper incentives to uphold the system. Even 
though Smith apparently took a pessimistic view of the state’s ability to take on this task, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that there is no other agent that can do so. An efficiently functioning market 
economy must be based on a symbiosis between the market and the state. 
6. What markets cannot do   
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As we have seen, a central conclusion of economic theory is that markets have the ability to allocate 
goods efficiently both with regard to production and consumption. But this conclusion has its 
limitations which have to do with the nature of the goods that we consider. The most obvious case 
where markets fail is that of public goods. A public good is such that once it has been provided 
everyone is able to benefit from it. A classic example is national defense. Your defense is my defense. 
If I were able to buy more defense for myself, you would benefit from it as much as I do. 
Consequently, if in such a situation I am mainly guided by my own interests, I have very weak private 
incentives to provide national defense, since the cost of my effort would fall entirely on me while the 
benefits would accrue to the whole population. But since all agents face the same incentives, a 
system of public goods provision that were based on voluntary contributions would be likely to result 
in underprovision of these goods. For national defense as well as for other cases of national 
infrastructure related to e.g. political institutions, police, courts of law and basic research, and for the 
wide class of cases that concerns the protection of the natural environment, one needs an agent that 
can overcome these adverse incentives. This agent is the state, which can take a broader view of 
benefits and costs than any individual consumer or firm. The market as a system is inadequate when 
it comes to the allocation of resources to public goods. 
Another class of market failure emerges with so-called externalities that may arise both with regard 
to consumption and production decision. In the present context, the most relevant case of 
externalities is where private decisions have as a side effect a negative or positive effect on the 
available quantity or quality of a public good. The most obvious examples relate to the natural 
environment. To take just one: Hunting for endangered species presumably provides private benefits 
for the hunter and for the people who buy his trophies. But hunting also imposes costs (or negative 
benefits) on the wider group of individuals who appreciate the public good of biological diversity. For 
that reason, hunting must be regulated in some way in order to improve the alignment of social 
benefits and costs, and the agents themselves cannot in general be relied upon to do it. There are 
basically two reasons for this. One is that individual incentives are not right: The individual huntsman 
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may see little point in restraining his hunting since he compares the possibly substantial loss of 
income to himself with the infinitesimal increase in benefits that he derives from his own 
contribution to the public good (assuming that he too cares about biological diversity). The other 
reason lies in the cost of organization: If huntsmen realize that a solution to the problem lies in 
forcing themselves to act together, they face the cost of organizing collective action. If there are 
many huntsmen – more generally many agents who are involved in the process that contribute to 
the deterioration of the public good – this cost may be so large that individually organized common 
action may be difficult to achieve8. Once again, we need the power of the state as a supplement to 
the market mechanism. 
This conclusion may need some modification. If the number of individuals involved in the process is 
not too large, and if the sets of agents who bear the costs and reap the benefits of collective action 
coincide, there are reasons to expect that both the incentives and organization problems may be 
overcome. Cases where this actually happens have been documented and analyzed in the research of 
Elinor Ostrom; see e.g. the survey presented in her Nobel lecture (Ostrom 2009).    
7. Equality versus efficiency 
 The strong point of the market economy from the broader social perspective is that markets – with 
some qualifications – generate an efficient allocation of resources. But in addition the allocation of 
resources has implications for the distribution of income and standards of living between individuals 
in society. The shape of this distribution is not mainly the result of moral deliberations about fairness 
and rights (although ideas about fair wages and reasonable differentials undoubtedly play some role 
in wage formation) but of market forces that reward productivity and ownership. These factors are 
only partly under the control of the individual, especially since the crucial point about them is not 
physical productivity and ownership, but the value of productivity and ownership as determined by 
market prices. The rewards to work and investment, as seen from the point of view of the individual, 
                                                          
8 This class of cases is sometimes referred to as the tragedy of the commons, a term introduced in a famous 
article by Garret Hardin (1968). 
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are therefore determined partly by skill and effort, partly by historical accident and sheer luck. On 
this background, it is not surprising that governments in modern societies have seen it as one of their 
tasks to modify the distribution of income and wealth to which the market economy gives rise. They 
do this through such policies as income support, social security arrangements and progressive 
income taxation. The objective of all these measures is to shift the market distribution of income in 
the direction of more equality and modify the impact of market movements on individual standards 
of living. 
Implicit in this line of argument is the belief that the market mechanism generates inequality. But 
this is a view that should be considered with a great deal of care. It is certainly true that a system 
that systematically rewards productivity necessarily leads to some inequalities of income. However, if 
the presumption is that the market economy leads to more inequality than would otherwise have 
been the case, it is important that one asks what “otherwise” means. What is the alternative system 
against which the inequality of the market economy is to be judged? This has to be one that 
systematically rewards work and investment on some other basis. Of the systems that have actually 
been tried out in practice, we know that the ideology of communist societies was to break the link 
with productivity by rewarding each according to his needs, but by doing this one also severed the 
link between income and effort, thereby causing adverse effects on productivity. In practice, 
moreover, the system of rewards tended to a considerable extent to reflect political privilege. It is far 
from clear that this was a more attractive system from the point of view of egalitarianism. 
Ideally, one could imagine a society where there is a perfect distribution of tasks between the market 
and the state. While competitive markets ensure the efficient use of resources with regard to private 
goods, the government imposes taxes and transfers that are designed both to finance public 
expenditure and to redistribute incomes so as to achieve a high degree of equality. The challenge 
that this ideal solution faces is that almost all taxes tend to reduce the efficiency of the market 
mechanism. A good example is the progressive income tax which involves taxing the rich at higher 
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rates than the poor. This modifies the distribution of income in the direction of more equality but at 
the same time it tends to discourage labour effort and saving by reducing the private returns to these 
activities. An increase in the degree of progression in order to achieve more equality tends to reduce 
the efficiency of the economy: Aggregate income falls and the total amount available for 
redistribution shrinks. This is what Arthur Okun (1975) referred to as “the big tradeoff”: More 
equality has a cost in the form of less efficiency. In other words, the more equally one wishes to 
divide the pie, the more it shrinks. How large the cost of redistribution actually is, is of course an 
empirical question, depending on such issues as the effectiveness of the progressive tax in 
redistributing income and the sensitivity of labour supply to high tax rates. 
The equality-efficiency tradeoff facing public policy in a market economy is a fundamental insight. 
However, there may be cases where progressive taxation and other redistributive policies are 
efficiency-enhancing rather than the opposite. One such case is where inequalities of income are not 
mainly explained by productivity differences, but rather by protected monopoly positions and other 
privileges; in this case progressive taxation may actually serve to bring after-tax wages more in line 
with productivity. Another case whose importance has been argued by a number of researchers is 
where the experience of living in a society with small income differentials increases productivity 
because it fosters a spirit of solidarity and cooperation between social classes and diminishes the 
amount of social conflict. Several economists have seen this as the main explanation of why the 
Scandinavian welfare states with their compressed wage structure and large tax distortions have 
nevertheless been able to do so well in terms of productivity and economic growth.  
8. The nature of preferences 
The economic analysis of markets has always come in for a good deal of criticism. Some of the 
criticism has clearly been misguided in that the critics have mistaken analysis for apology: The 
economic explanation of how markets work has been misinterpreted as a justification for all that the 
critics see as the negative aspects of the market economy. But much of the critical literature – which 
20 
 
has originated both inside and outside of the economics profession - has also been well taken and 
should be seriously considered. 
Part of the criticism has been aimed at the assumptions that economists use to explain the driving 
forces of market behavior: These are said to reflect a simple view of man as greedy and self-seeking. 
Some of the responsibility for this kind of interpretation should clearly be placed in the economics 
community itself; there are examples of textbooks that use a very similar terminology to describe the 
theory of market behavior. At the same time, leading economists have always been sensitive to this 
kind of criticism. In his debates with the critics of economics in the early nineteenth century, John 
Stuart Mill strongly emphasized the point that the effort to understand and predict actual social and 
economic developments did not involve any moral acceptance of them. Half a century later, in his 
influential treatise on economic theory Alfred Marshall took a broad view of human motivation when 
he wrote that 
“[e]veryone who is worth anything carries his higher nature with him into business; and, 
there as elsewhere, he is influenced by his personal affections, by his conceptions of duty and 
his reverence for high ideals.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 14.) 
It is fair to say, however, that this broad view of man’s nature plays a fairly minor role in Marshall’s 
more analytical contributions to economic analysis, as it does in the economic theory that is 
presented in much of the modern literature. In the textbook accounts of the utility-maximizing 
consumer whose preferences only concern the amount of different goods that he himself consumes, 
and the firm whose only concern is with the maximization of income for the owners, the critical 
reader may well ask what has become of the “higher nature” of economic agents that Marshall refers 
to. 
However, a point that should be born in mind when interpreting modern economic theory is that 
economists are keen adherents of the principle of Occam’s razor: Never use complicated theories to 
explain your observations when simpler theories will do. When applied to the economics of 
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consumer behavior, the principle implies that it is unnecessary to take account of people’s 
preferences over public goods like defense, law enforcement and biological diversity if the object of 
the analysis is simply to study how the demand for consumer goods depends on prices and incomes. 
Nevertheless, when one moves from the study of consumption demand to the field of public finance 
and the analysis of public goods, this more general assumption about the nature of preferences 
becomes of essential importance. Several economists have also taken an interest in the analysis of 
charitable giving. In order to provide a theoretical basis for empirical studies in this area it becomes 
imperative to postulate that the individual consumer has preferences that take account not only of 
his own consumption but also of that of others, although this interdependence may be neglected in 
many other applications of utility maximization to consumer behaviour. All of this shows that the 
theory of the utility-maximizing consumer is not in the nature of a specific hypothesis of what the 
individual cares about; it is an analytical approach that can be applied to a wide variety of issues. It 
does not by necessity incorporate a general view of man as egoistic and self-seeking; in any particular 
theoretical application, the specific assumptions made about the nature of preferences reflect the 
context in which the theory is to be used. In some arenas of economic activity a narrow view of 
preferences is sufficient to explain behavior, while in others a broader set of assumptions will be 
necessary. But economists have not been very good at explaining the connection between the 
broader view of economic behavior and the more narrow assumptions that are adopted for the 
explanation of specific problems. This failure no doubt lies at the root of at least some of the criticism 
that has been directed against the economist’s allegedly simplistic view of human nature. 
These remarks should not be taken to imply that there is nothing in the standard theory of market 
behaviour that is in need of revision and extension. Thus, a view that is mostly implicit in the 
literature is that the individual’s preferences are autonomous. They appear to have their origin in his 
or her personality and can be analyzed in isolation from the social context. Social influences, norms, 
ethical concerns and religious convictions are usually absent from the analysis. A few examples are 
sufficient to illustrate this point. 
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Some people would never consider having pork meat on their plate or drink wine with their meal. In 
a few cases this might be because they simply do not like pork or wine but a more likely explanation 
is that they are obeying the demands of their religion. They might actually know from previous 
experience that they like pork and wine; nevertheless, the preferences revealed in their market 
behaviour suggest that they do not. What are their “true” preferences? The majority of economists 
would probably argue that whatever the true preferences are, the ones that are relevant for the 
study of market behavior are the revealed preferences, and for this purpose it is irrelevant whether 
these preferences have their origin in the individual’s physiological and psychological makeup or in 
his religious views. But this argument may be too superficial. On the one hand, taking account of 
religious views could play a role in positive economics since predictions of the rise or decline of 
religious convictions might be helpful for long run forecasts of consumer demand. From a normative 
perspective, moreover, peoples’ judgments concerning social welfare might be heavily influenced by 
religious views that do not respect the principle of consumer sovereignty, i.e. the principle that it is 
the individual’s own preferences that should count in an evaluation of what is good for society.  
A second example concerns the analysis of labour supply. Understanding individual decisions about 
how much and what kind of work to supply is central for the understanding of how modern 
economies work. It is crucial for the analysis of welfare state policies and for long run economic 
development. The economic theory of labour supply is based on a model of utility maximization 
where the individual makes his choice of hours worked on the basis of an evaluation of the utility of 
consumption on the one hand and leisure on the other. The more leisure he gives up to work, the 
higher becomes his earnings and the more he is able to consume. His optimum choice is where his 
subjective valuation of leisure in terms of consumption is equal to the hourly wage rate. The model 
leads to the prediction that a higher wage rate leads to increased labour supply while a lower wage 
rate leads to a contraction of labour supply9. Note that the relevant wage rate is the after-tax wage. 
                                                          
9 A qualification is in order: The increase in the wage rate means that the worker has higher earnings at his 
initial level of labour supply. He might react to this by wanting to buy more leisure, i.e. to reduce his labour 
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Thus, a positive incentive to supply more labour could come about both as a result of an increase in 
the market wage or though a reduction of the marginal tax rate on earnings. 
Where do these labour-leisure preferences come from? Most expositions of the theory are silent on 
this point but leave one with the impression that the preferences originate in some way with the 
individuals themselves and that it is unnecessary to consider the social environment in which they 
live. However, there have been alternative and influential views on this issue. The sociologist and 
economist Max Weber (1904) claimed that the protestant ethic led to attitudes to work, saving and 
economic activity that in turn generated economic prosperity for society, and similar views were 
advanced by the economic historian Richard Tawney (1926). Neither Weber nor Tawney presented 
their views in the formalized manner of modern economic theory, but their basic idea clearly implies 
that the labour-leisure preferences of modern textbooks must be seen as being formed by the social 
environment, in this case by the work ethic inspired by peoples’ religious views. One could imagine 
this set of ethical beliefs leading to e.g. a higher rate of labour market participation, later retirement, 
and less utilization of social security benefits than would otherwise have been the case. 
The general point that the two examples illustrate is that the individual preferences that are 
expressed in people’s market behavior cannot be seen in isolation from ethical and religious 
convictions; more generally, they are conditioned by the social environment in which people live. A 
purely individualistic approach to the study of labour supply may come to neglect important 
influences on long-run economic development. 
9. Economics as an influence on society  
Positive economics is concerned with the study of how the actual economy works. Normative 
economics, on the other hand, tries to derive criteria for economic welfare and to design reforms 
that can make the economic system perform better. One should not be surprised that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
supply. This income effect pulls in the opposite direction from the incentive or substitution effect. Although the 
substitution effect may be the most relevant for predicting short-run changes in labour supply, the income 
effect is more relevant for understanding the long-run trend towards reduced hours of work. 
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conclusions of normative economic studies often turn out to be more controversial that the findings 
of positive economics. This is especially true in recent times when many observers have argued that 
economists tend to recommend the introduction of the mindset of the market in areas of life where 
this way of thinking is misplaced. Before turning to the recent debate, however, I will consider a 
historical case that may throw some light on modern concerns10.  
Edwin Chadwick (1800-1890) was an English civil servant who was much influenced by the utilitarian 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham as well as by the economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill, and in his 
work in various areas of social reform he was keen to utilize the ideas that he found in the literature 
on economics. During his long and very active career as a public administrator he made a number of 
important contributions to the design of policy and pioneered both in the creative design of 
incentive-based mechanisms and in the use of empirical data. An interesting example of Chadwick’s 
inventiveness in the exploitation of incentives for administrative improvement is his initiative 
regarding the transportation of British criminals to Australia. According to the account of Ekelund 
and Hébert (1997), the captains of the vessels in charge of the transports were originally paid a flat 
fee per prisoner taken on board in the port of departure. When at Sidgwick’s suggestion the scheme 
was changed so that the captains were paid per prisoner who disembarked alive in Australia, the 
survival rate among the convicts increased from 40 per cent to 98.5 per cent! Most economists 
would not hesitate in characterizing this as a triumph of economic analysis in designing a reform 
based on market incentives that conveys obvious benefits on all parties concerned as well as on 
society as a whole11. 
                                                          
10 More or less implicit in this line of criticism is the view that the mindset of the market should be seen as 
negative from a social perspective. But this is far from obvious; 18th century thinkers like Montesquieu and 
Condorcet believed that the market economy produced a type of man that was likely to be reliable, honest, 
friendly and helpful. The historical development of this view has been presented in an interesting article by 
Hirschman (1982). 
11 In his popular book on the history of everyday life, Bill Bryson (2010, p. 510) writes that Chadwick was an 
“intense and cheerless figure” and that almost nobody liked him. But as this story shows, some had good 
reason to like him very much, at least if they judged him by the results of his efforts.  
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On second thoughts, however, perhaps there is an aspect of the story that may be a cause for 
concern. When we look at the initial system of incentives, the captains would seem to have had 
virtually no economic motivation to keep the prisoners alive during the sea voyage; still, 40 per cent 
of the convicts were in fact alive on arrival in Australia. Since the 40 per cent was an average for all 
transports, the survival rate for some voyages must have been considerably higher, indicating that 
some captains must after all have taken reasonably good care of their charges without the type of 
incentives embodied in Sidgwick’s scheme. For these captains, the new financial incentives took the 
place of the moral incentives that had previously guided their behavior. To use the concepts of 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003), the extrinsic incentives of the new payments system “crowded out” the 
intrinsic incentives that apparently guided the behavior of at least some of the captains. As the point 
has been formulated in a different context by Bruno Frey “a constitution for knaves crowds out 
public virtues” (Frey 1997).  
With regard to this particular historical example, the concern for the weakening of moral motivation 
may seem absurd. The documented effects of the new set of incentives were so overwhelmingly 
positive that any such objection to it must be regarded as being of minor importance if not cynical. 
However, the example is not without relevance for the understanding of some of the criticism of 
more recent proposals to introduce economic incentives and markets in fields that have traditionally 
been governed by different principles. In the words of the philosopher Michael Sandel, “market 
values and market reasoning increasingly reach into spheres of life previously governed by 
nonmarket norms.” He goes on to argue that “this tendency is troubling; putting a price on every 
human activity erodes certain moral and civic goods worth caring about” (Sandel 2013, p. 121). He 
lists a number of areas where market thinking has been introduced and where in his opinion it has 
adversely affected attitudes and values. These areas include pregnancy for pay, trade in human 
organs, the sale of lobbying services, selling the right to kill endangered species and many others. A 
basic objection to these practices, in Sandel’s view, is that subjecting the activity or good in question 
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to market thinking degrades it from a social and moral point of view; reorganizing society to extend 
the domain of the market should not be regarded as a value neutral reform12. 
This line of argument is of course not new; thus, slavery and corruption have been denounced by 
leading economists since the early days of the subject. In the case of slavery it is clear that slaves are 
forced to be part of a transaction that does not serve their own interests. Corrupt dealings are 
deliberately designed so as to harm third parties. If one thinks of slave trade and corruption as 
market transactions, they are clearly inconsistent with the market paradigm that lead economists to 
think of the market mechanism as being beneficial to society, and the classical economists took a 
strong position against such practices. 
When thinking about the issues raised by Sandel and others the main difficulty that one encounters 
is obviously where to draw the line between desirable and undesirable applications of the market 
paradigm. A general answer is difficult to provide, but a couple of examples may illustrate the 
challenges involved. 
The first example concerns the environment. The problem of global warming is undoubtedly the 
most massive case of market failure that the world has ever seen. Economists have proposed a 
number of market-based incentive mechanisms to try to come to grips with the problem, including 
“green taxes” on environmentally harmful goods and activities as well as tradable emission quotas. 
These policy instruments have great potential for achieving substantial results, and to argue that 
they are socially inferior to appeals to individual morality represents a severe underestimation of the 
incentive problems that arise with regard to individual provision of a global public good. In this case, 
the argument that extrinsic incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation seems to me to carry little 
weight relative to the enormity of the social problems that are at stake and that need to be solved 
within a fairly short time horizon. 
                                                          
12 For critical discussions of Sandel’s views see Besley (2013) and Bruni and Sugden (2013). A more descriptive 
analysis of the social legitimacy of different systems for the allocation of resources that respond to both 
efficiency and equity concerns can be found in Elster (1993). 
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The second example relates to the debate about the possibilities for improving performance in the 
public sector. Creating stronger incentives in the workplace has been a central topic for discussion in 
proposals to make public institutions in areas like health and education perform more efficiently. 
Good performance should according to these proposals be rewarded, as when academics are paid a 
bonus for publication in a high-quality journal. Among the objections that have been raised against 
this practice is the argument that it instils an attitude that you are not expected to perform well if 
you are not paid for it. Since academics are employed in institutions where they are expected to 
perform multiple tasks (such as administration, teaching and popular writing), monetary reward for 
one type of activity may lead them to downgrade the importance of the other activities. A possible 
response to this objection is obviously to introduce rewards for good performance in the other 
activities also, but this easily leads into a system that is too complicated to operate efficiently. 
There is obviously much more to be said about the introduction of market incentives and 
mechanisms in areas where they have not previously been tried. But the two examples may at least 
indicate that there is no easy conclusion to be drawn regarding its desirability. The environmental 
case is one where the conscious use of market incentives has the promise to do a lot of good for 
society, and where the concern for the effects on intrinsic incentives must be considered to be of the 
second order of importance. The discussion of incentives in the workplace makes us aware that 
extrinsic incentives may sometimes have undesirable side effects and that in ensuring a high quality 
of work performance one cannot do without a strong work ethic and intrinsic incentives. The validity 
of this conclusion must certainly hold beyond the case of formalized employment relationship and be 
at least as relevant for the voluntary sector that plays such a large role in our societies. 
10. Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the market economy in terms of the interplay between utility-maximizing consumers 
and profit-maximizing producers plays a central role in modern economics. Since the time of Adam 
Smith economists have been concerned with the development of the internal logic of their models of 
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markets, sometimes with the consequence that too little attention has been paid to the broader 
social context in which market transactions take place. However, some of this social context is in fact 
implicit in the standard models, and the present paper has attempted to bring some of these hidden 
assumptions out in the open. A common criticism of economists is that they base their analyses and 
policy recommendations on a narrow view of man as egoistic and self-seeking. No doubt there are 
some economists who in fact hold this view, but it is not a necessary implication of economic theory. 
For an enlightened understanding of economic theory it is essential to keep in mind that economists 
do not find it necessary to present a full account of human motivation in the analysis of each and 
every piece of analysis. We may subscribe to Alfred Marshall’s view of man’s “higher nature” and at 
the same time acknowledge that he was right in leaving it out from his analysis of the demand for 
fish. 
The normative study of the properties of the market mechanism has over time led to a deeper 
understanding of what markets can do and what they cannot do. In recent years there has developed 
an increased interest in extending the market paradigm to areas that have traditionally been 
governed by other systems of resource allocation. The wisdom of some of these extensions has been 
questioned by critics both from the inside and outside of the economics profession, and the debate 
has raised important issues that will no doubt be discussed further in the years ahead.  
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